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INTRODUCTION 
Some, including Professor Levasseur himself, might object to the title 
of this Essay because, one might argue, this title is potentially misleading. 
The expression “linguist” is today often reserved for someone who, by dent 
of specialized academic training, either studies languages scientifically and 
writes about them as a scholar or serves as a professional translator from one 
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language into another. Professor Levasseur, as he himself is happy to 
acknowledge, has received no such training. Though he is a scholar, and 
at least in some sense—the sense of “legal science,” as understood in the 
civil law tradition—a “scientist,” most of his scholarship has been 
concentrated in the fields of legal history, legal methodology, civil law, 
and comparative law. He does not now, nor has he ever, earned his living 
by translating for “hire.” 
Still, I think the title is entirely appropriate. To begin with, the 
expression “linguist” carries a second and more expansive denotation, 
namely, one who is “master of tongues other than his own.”1 Professor 
Levasseur certainly fits this description. The son of a French consular 
officer, he grew up speaking French at home, of course, but was also 
exposed to other languages as his father was stationed here and there, 
including Spain and Brazil. During grade school in France, he studied not 
only English, but also Spanish, becoming quite fluent in the latter thanks 
in large part to the assistance of his Hispanophone mother. Upon his 
graduation from law school, he spent six months at the City of London 
College, where he first immersed himself in English. The following year, 
he came to the United States as a graduate student in law. From then until 
now, English has served as his primary professional language, though he 
has continued to work in French as well. He is, then, certainly a “linguist” 
in the broad sense of “master of other tongues.” But even if one were to 
stick with the narrower denotation of “linguist” noted above, one could 
still defend the title. Though most of his scholarship has been devoted to 
other topics, he has still written a number of scholarly articles on the topic 
of law and language, with a particular emphasis on legal translation. This 
still-growing corpus of work, which now numbers five pieces, includes 
ones entitled “Discourse on Our Method”2 and “Our Approach to 
Translation.”3 The citations included in these works show that he has 
                                                                                                             
 1. 8 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 992 (2d ed. 1992) (definition 1). 
 2. This “Discourse” forms the introductory section of Alain Levasseur & 
David Gruning, Version Louisianaise, in L’ART DE LA TRADUCTION, L’ACCUEIL 
INTERNATIONAL DE L’AVANT-PROJET DE RÉFORME DU DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS 
33–35 (Pierre Catala ed., 2011) [hereinafter L’art de la Traduction]. 
 3. Alain A. Levasseur & J. Randall Trahan, Our Approach to Translation, 
in GÉRARD CORNU, DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL CODE xiv (Alain Levasseur et al. 
trans., 2015) [hereinafter Approach]. Professor Levasseur’s other three works on 
legal translation are: Alain A. Levasseur, Les Maux des Mots en Droit Comparé: 
L’avant-projet de Réforme du Droit des Obligations en Anglais, 2008 REVUE 
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ [R.I.D.C.] 819 [hereinafter Maux des 
Mots]; Alain A. Levasseur, Réflexions Introductives, 68 LANGUES ET PROCÈS 9, 
68 (2015) [hereinafter Réflexions]; Alain A. Levasseur, Ruminations Around the 
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studied most if not all of the pertinent literature—the most prominent 
works on legal translation, both in French and in English. In addition, 
either on his own or in collaboration with others, he has now produced 
translations of at least four books from French into English, including 
Christian Atias’ Le Droit Civil and more recently Gerard Cornu’s 
Vocabulaire Juridique.4 Professor Levasseur has also produced 
translations of at least four legislative documents from French into 
English, including the French Constitution of 1958, the French Civil Code, 
and most recently the pending “Avant-Projet of the Reform of the Law of 
Obligations” of France. In the end, then, his only “deficiency” (if that is 
even the right word) as a linguist in the narrow sense is his lack of formal 
training in linguistics. But what some people lack in the way of formal 
training, they often make up through experience. When it comes to 
linguistics, Professor Levasseur, thanks to his abundant experience, is just 
such a person. 
My aim in this Essay is to provide an exposé of the approach 
Professeur Levasseur has taken in his work as a “legal linguist”—to be 
more precise, his method of legal translation. The exposé begins by 
examining, if only briefly, what one might call the “backdrop” against 
which he has developed that method—his understanding of the 
relationship between “legal language,” on the one hand, and “legal 
culture,” on the other. Having done that, the exposé examines, in this 
order, Professor Levasseur’s understanding of what legal translation is, 
what its proper ends are, and what means should be used to attain those 
ends. Finally, the exposé presents a brief critical valuation of his method. 
Before proceeding, I should point out several difficulties facing me 
that complicate the task to which I’ve set my hand. The first is that, in all 
of the scholarship on legal translation that Professor Levasseur has so far 
produced, none of it contains a comprehensive and systematic presentation 
of his method. In the place of such a work, one instead finds several works 
that amount to “defenses” of the approach to or the method of translation 
that he and his collaborators adopted in undertaking the translation of this 
or that particular text. The most notable of these defenses are his works on 
the first avant-projet of the reform of the French law of obligations (the 
so-called Avant-Projet Catala) and on the Vocabulaire Juridique. Further, 
all of these works concern the translation of texts that involve one and the 
same body of law—the French civil law—written in one and the same 
                                                                                                             
Dictionary of the Civil Code, 9 J. CIV. L. STUD. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript 
on file with Author) [hereinafter Ruminations]. 
 4. GÉRARD CORNU, DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL CODE (Alain Levasseur et al. 
trans., 2015) [hereinafter DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL CODE]. The Vocabulaire 
Juridique might be thought of as France’s answer to Black’s Law Dictionary.  
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source language—French—into one and the same target language—
English. Providing the reader with a view of Professor Levasseur’s 
“method in general” will therefore require that I make some abstractions 
and extrapolations from these particular works. 
A second difficulty that I face is that the works in question are in large 
part polemical, that is, directed against other translators who have taken a 
different and, in Professor Levasseur’s judgment, problematic approach to 
legal translation. The writing in those works, then, includes a good bit of 
rhetoric, and at points perhaps even hyperbole. When this fact is added to 
that of the “occasionalness” of the works, it becomes clear that Professor 
Levasseur, in his writing on legal translation, has been more Martin Luther 
than John Calvin. The task of exposing the underlying method is 
accordingly made that much more difficult. 
A third difficulty is that most of Professor Levasseur’s works on the 
topic of legal translation, including the most comprehensive—Les Maux 
des Mots—were written in French, not in English. To the extent that I wish 
to include quotations of those works in my exposé—and I will, with a 
vengeance—I must then not only explain but also translate. 
The fourth and final difficulty that I face arises not from Professor 
Levasseur or his work, but rather from me. Though he can claim the title 
of legal linguist in the narrow sense, I cannot. With one exception that I 
will mention shortly, I have never—at least not before writing this Essay—
written on the topic of legal translation. Nor have I, for that matter, ever 
made a thorough study of the scholarship on this topic, instead having 
studied this or that part of this or that work on legal translation as the need 
might have arisen. I say this to let the reader know up front that I am hardly 
an expert in or master of legal translation. Nevertheless, as far as providing 
an exposé of Professor Levasseur’s approach to legal translation is 
concerned, I am arguably in a better position than most—in fact, than 
anyone else, save perhaps David Gruning, his long-time collaborator in his 
work of legal translation—to handle the task. That is because I have had 
the privilege of serving as one of his principal collaborators on his last 
three major translation projects—namely, the translation of the 
Vocabulaire Juridique, the entire French Civil Code, and most recently, 
the new avant-projet of the reform of the French law of obligations, which 
is now pending before the French Parliament. Further, I co-authored with 
him one of his works on legal translation—one of the introductory sections 
to our translation of the Vocabularie Juridique, entitled “Our Approach to 
Translation.” Perhaps the knowledge I have gained “hands on” as I have 
worked with him on these projects will, at least to some extent, help to 
make up for some of my other deficits. 
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I have one final warning for the reader. This Essay is about Professor 
Levasseur’s approach to legal translation, not about my approach or even 
“my take” on his approach. For that reason, I plan to let Professor Levasseur, 
as it were, “speak in his own words,” to the extent that that is possible. The 
reader should therefore prepare for more than the usual amount of 
quotations, including extended block quotations. My role will be limited, for 
the most part, to synthesizing those words, re-presenting them in systematic 
fashion, and, where appropriate, providing clarifications or expansions of 
them. 
I. THE BACKDROP OF THE APPROACH: LAW AND LANGUAGE 
For Professor Levasseur, it is a given that within any culture, there is 
between the “language” and the “law” an intimate and complex 
connection. Quoting Gerard Cornu with approval, he writes: 
Law and language are very close to each other in nature . . . ; if 
one considers law and language in themselves, together in a given 
society, their kinship is fundamental. The practice of the language, 
the practice of the law, both stem from behavior of the people that 
is cut off from scholarly impulses. [In other words,] law and 
language are children of custom, which is as much as to say 
brother and sister . . . . There exists at once a distinctive essence 
of language and a spirit of the law, brother essences, stemming 
from and bearers of the same mentality, birth, and destiny . . . . 
There remains between the language and the law of a people a 
privileged order of relations that calls for respect. . . . There reigns 
between a language and a law a sui generis natural harmony . . . .5 
[W]hat seals the kinship of law and language is the mediation of 
a third term, the nurturing milieu that accompanies their 
blossoming, in a word, the culture from which they stem. Law and 
language are cultural artifacts . . . .6 
Thanks to this intimate and complex connection, Professor Levasseur 
believes that the language of the law in any given culture is shot through 
with the distinctive elements of that culture—not only the culture at large, 
but also, and even more so, the legal culture in particular. Quoting Cornu 
again, he contends that “the language of the law is a cultural language, a 
bond, a good, a benefit of the legal culture.”7 Like Paul Roubier, he 
                                                                                                             
 5. L’art de la Traduction, supra note 2, at 41 (Author’s translation). 
 6. Maux des Mots, supra note 3, at 838 (Author’s translation). 
 7. Réflexions, supra note 3, at 13 (Author’s translation).  
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maintains that “the words [of a legal language] . . . constitute . . . an 
important element of juridical technique. The words, in fact . . . are the 
representation of concepts that epitomize the tendencies of the legal 
system.”8 As François Geny, whom he also quotes with approval, wrote: 
[W]ords and their arrangements into phrases . . . present 
themselves, in the course of every juridical elaboration, as a 
prolongation, one that is practically necessary, of concepts. These 
are exteriorized and become communicable only by means of 
language . . . . And, . . . the law presents to us the most clearly-
characterized discipline of the life of man in society . . . . The law 
will draw from current language, which offers to us the common 
foundation from which all of the channels that cause ideas to 
circulate through social life are fed. The jurist applies himself to 
drawing from this common foundation the expressions and the 
organization of them necessary to make sense, profound and 
specific, of the precepts of the law. From this [exercise] arises . . . 
a technical language that is based on the common language . . . .9 
For these reasons, he agrees with Patrick Glenn that “a different language 
implies different concepts and [therefore] the conceptual difference 
between legal systems and legal traditions is important.”10 
Because of these differences between the legal languages of different 
legal traditions, there is, between those languages, what Professor 
Levasseur, following Cornu, calls a “linguisitic screen.”11 Translating 
from one of these languages into the other requires penetrating that screen. 
“The opacity of this screen,” he writes, “is more or less penetrable 
depending upon the nature of the combination of the originality of the 
languages and of the particularity of the legal cultures that exist on the one 
side and the other of this screen.”12 The greater the differences between 
the languages and the legal cultures in question, the greater is the 
difficulty. 
This understanding of the intimate and complex connection between 
the law and language of a given culture has significant implications, of 
course, for the work of legal translation. If the translator is to do his work 
properly—if he is to “penetrate” the “screen” and do it well—then he must 
endeavor to the extent possible, Professor Levasseur maintains, to “cause 
                                                                                                             
 8. Maux des Mots, supra note 3, at 830 (Author’s translation). 
 9. Id. at 831 (Author’s translation). 
 10. Réflexions, supra note 3, at 13 (Author’s translation). 
 11. Id. at 12. 
 12. Id. (Author’s translation). 
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the reader of one certain legal tradition to feel all the cultural subtleties of 
certain concepts, principles, institutions of another legal tradition.”13 
Expanding on this same point, Professor Levasseur has noted the 
following: 
The words that are identified with a certain language of a people 
are the outward and visible symbols, images and icons that the 
culture of that people conveys in an attempt to bring the reader or 
listener into its depth through the use of that reader’s or listener’s 
own language. Therefore, it becomes the duty and mission, more 
than the mere role of the translator-artist to trust in his talent 
permeated with human feelings and guided by his intellectual 
skill, to shape the culture of one people, the ‘sender,’ into a work 
that another people, the ‘receiver,’ can readily understand and 
accept as being worthy of as much respect and acceptance as its 
own culture. The language that the translator should use must be 
‘transparent’ not opaque, thoughtful and not dismissive so that the 
reader-receiver will be able to see on his side of the mirror the 
very message couched in his language that the sender meant to 
convey on his side of the same mirror.14 
Now, for the legal translator to enable the reader to “feel the cultural 
subtleties” of the text he is translating, he must do more than focus his 
attention on the mere words of the source language that are to be translated 
and on the mere words of the target language that might serve to render 
them. Over and above that, he must also consider and take into account the 
larger legal culture within which those words, on one side as on the other, 
are embedded and of which they are the expressions. In other words, he 
must go beyond “denotation” to “connotation,” understanding that the 
“context” of this connotation includes, in its ultimate extension, the entire 
legal culture as a whole. In a sense, he must translate not only legal text 
but also legal culture. 
II. PRESENTATION OF THE APPROACH 
Grasping Professor Levasseur’s “approach” to legal translation requires 
an understanding of his notion of legal translation as well as his understanding 
of the proper ends and means of legal translation.  
                                                                                                             
 13. Maux des Mots, supra note 3, at 850 (Author’s translation). 
 14. Ruminations, supra note 3 (manuscript at 3). 
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A. Legal Translation: What Is It? 
Given the nature of Professor Levasseur’s works on legal translation—
works that are episodic and polemical—it is perhaps not surprising that he 
has written little about what, to his mind, legal translation “is.” In one of 
those works, he did note, if only in passing, that “‘translation’ in the strict 
sense of the term [is] the written transposition of one language into 
another.”15 But beyond that, to the extent he has written anything at all on 
the subject, he has resorted to metaphor. 
In his most recent writing on the topic of legal translation, Professor 
Levasseur has compared the work of translation to not one but two of the 
“arts,” in the narrow sense of that word: sculpture and music. Regarding 
sculpture, he writes: 
I felt like a sculptor probably feels when he faces a block of marble 
out of which he is to carve a statue. Most likely the sculptor sees 
in his mind and feels in his heart far beyond the block of marble. 
He can touch the silhouette, the curvature, the profile of the statue 
before it finds life in his skilled and toned hands. To translate is, 
in a sense, to practice the art of shaping and carving out all the 
beliefs, aspirations, ideals and values that are hidden in a given 
block of words; it is to transform them into words meant to 
captivate the awareness of the mind and the sensitivity of the heart 
of the reader. 
Of music, he says: 
This art and this technique of translating are the same, I believe, as 
those that one finds in a musical composition that the hands and 
talent of a pianist must ‘interpret’ or translate into ‘sounds’ with the 
intent of touching the mind and heart of an audience. Music critics 
who hear the same Mozart concerto will seldom share exactly or 
never to the same extent the same views on the pianist’s 
performance because their hearts and minds will not have heard the 
same sounds nor felt the same emotions with the same intensity[]. 
The translator and the pianist are given a ‘written score’ which is 
not their creation; yet, somehow, they must attempt to immerse 
themselves into the person and personality of the author-composer 
so as to allow and entice the reader or listener to do likewise. A 
                                                                                                             
 15. Réflexions, supra note 3, at 12 (Author’s translation). 
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written musical score is under the fingers of a pianist like the words 
of a text are under the pen of a translator.16 
For purposes of understanding Professor Levasseur’s method of legal 
translation, the important takeaways from his statements regarding the 
nature of legal translation seem to be as follows. First, legal translation is 
less a science than an art. Among the chief implications of characterizing 
legal translation in this fashion is that whatever techniques, maxims, or 
rules that the translator may think to use in his work can never be 
“mechanically” applied. Second, legal translation inevitably involves 
“interpretation,” specifically, interpretation of the legal term to be 
translated—and, possibly, of the term that has been proposed to render it, 
at least where that term, too, is a legal term.17 This work of interpretation, 
of course, requires not only a knowledge of the field of the law where the 
term to be translated forms a part, but also an appreciation of and 
sensitivity to the larger legal culture within which that field of law is set.18 
B. The Ends of Legal Translation 
In contrast to many other legal translators, Professor Levasseur has 
consistently pursued multiple objectives in his work of legal translation. 
Under this heading, one can distinguish a “general” objective and several 
more “particular” objectives. 
1. The End in General 
Though Professor Levasseur has never stated what he understands to be 
the “general” ends toward which legal translation should be directed—no 
doubt because he believes it to be so obvious—there can be no question that 
these ends are no different for him than they are for any other legal 
translator. The point of such translation, in short, is to enable a person who 
is not conversant with the language in which a certain legal text is written to 
read it in a language with which he is conversant, and thus to understand it. 
                                                                                                             
 16. Ruminations, supra note 3 (manuscript at 5). 
 17. See Réflexions, supra note 3, at 13–14. 
 18. See Maux des Mots, supra note 3, at 822 (“The fundamental question that 
the reader will be led to ask himself at the end of this article is whether, by his 
translation of the [text] into English . . . , the translator has succeeded in assuring 
for the reader that there is an identity and fidelity between the words of the English 
vocabulary that he has chosen and the background of these words, that is to say, 
the French civilian legal culture that was incorporated into this [text].” (Author’s 
translation)). 
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2. More Particular Ends 
Beyond this general objective, however, Professor Levasseur has at 
least two other, more particular, objectives, which he has stated clearly and 
openly. To understand his approach to legal translation, one must have a 
firm appreciation of these other objectives, for they have helped to shape 
that approach in profound ways. 
Though recasting each of these objectives (especially the first) in 
terms that would render them of more widespread applicability might be 
possible (in other words, to universalize them, without regard to their 
particular translation context), they are, in the forms in which they have 
been stated by Professor Levasseur himself, limited to the particular 
translation context in which all of his translation work has taken place. 
That is the translation of French civil law materials into English.  
a. Facilitating Legal Research 
Throughout his work as a legal translator, Professor Levasseur has 
been concerned, almost before all else, to produce translations that will 
facilitate—or at least not frustrate—“legal research.” This concern, of 
course, is entirely reasonable. To be sure, it is certainly possible that the 
reader of a given translated legal text might have only a “casual” interest 
in reading it, such that he would never feel the need to look beyond or 
behind it for additional information. But readers of this kind are 
undoubtedly rare birds. Much more common is the reader who, upon 
reading this or that part of the text, would need to find out more about what 
this or that term that he has encountered in that text means. To do that, the 
reader would have to look to other sources of information, that is, to 
conduct legal research. 
In relation specifically to his work translating French civil law texts 
into English, Professor Levasseur’s research-related concerns have 
extended to two different groups of researchers. The first he describes this 
way: 
First of all, there is the English-language jurist who is also capable 
. . . of reading and understanding French, especially legal French, 
or legal Spanish. By virtue of his knowledge of some civil law, 
this Anglophone jurist would then be able to conduct research in 
works of French, Quebec, or Spanish doctrine as well as in 
collections of French, Quebec, or Spanish jurisprudence.19 
                                                                                                             
 19. Maux des Mots, supra note 3, at 843 (Author’s translation). 
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Here is his description of the second group of researchers: 
Still more important for us was, of course, the case of the 
exclusively Anglophone jurist who is called upon to conduct 
research into the civil law in his English language, the only one 
that he has mastered.20  
 
[T]o our knowledge, there are no works of doctrine on the French 
Civil Code that have been written, as opposed to translated, into 
English. In the absence of such doctrine, and thinking of a jurist 
who knows only the English language, a first alternative would be 
that this reader can turn to some works of doctrine in the English 
language on the civil law of the brother or cousin legal systems of 
the French legal system, such as the civil law of Quebec or of 
Louisiana. And certain works of this kind exist. Thus, by the 
intermediary of these doctrines that are “sister or cousin” to the 
French Civil Code, the Anglophone reader would make progress 
in civil law doctrine and would be instructed in the civilian 
juridical culture that has been put within his reach in the English 
language. . . . A second alternative, clearly, would be to have 
works of French doctrine translated into the English language.21 
For ease of reference, I will hereafter refer to the first of these groups of 
researchers as the “multilinguists” and to the second, as the “monolinguists.” 
As Professor Levasseur sees it, if legal translation is to meet the needs 
of these researchers, be they multilinguists or monolinguists, then the 
translators must write those translations in such a way as to facilitate—and 
never to frustrate—this research. And if the translation is to do that, then 
it must, first, be technically accurate and precise, and second, be couched 
in terms that correspond to terms used in the sources in which that research 
will be conducted, be they foreign civil law scholarship written in some 
language other than English, English translations of that doctrine and 
jurisprudence, or the doctrine and jurisprudence of English-speaking civil 
law jurisdictions. Oversimplifying somewhat, the reason for this has to do 
with “indexing.” This scholarship will, of course, be indexed on the basis 
of the terms used within it. If the translation uses terms other than those 
“indexing” terms, then the reader of the translation will not find these 
materials and, by not finding them, will not have the benefit of them. 
                                                                                                             
 20. Id. at 844 (Author’s translation). 
 21. L’art de la Traduction, supra note 2, at 34 (Author’s translation). 
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b. Contributing Positively to the Ongoing Development of “The Civil 
Law in English” 
Underlying all of Professor Levasseur’s work as a legal translator is 
his realization that every translation he produces is more than “just a 
translation,” that is, a means of meeting the immediate need of members 
of some audience that speaks a foreign language, in this case English, to 
understand the particular French text in question. To the contrary, he 
rightly believes that each of these works inevitably makes a contribution, 
however humble, to the ongoing development of a new, burgeoning legal 
language: one that is international in the scope of its usage—the “civil law 
in English,” as he likes to put it. His concern is to assure that the 
contribution his translations make is at once significant and salutary. 
It is as obvious as the nose on one’s face that, for better or for worse, 
English is the new—and still rising—lingua franca of the entire world. 
This includes that part of the world in which the private law is civilian in 
character, where this new lingua franca has already become the 
predominant language in which people conduct all manner of international 
communications—those of business, diplomacy, and science, to name just 
the most prominent. For reasons that can be readily understood, the same 
is true even of international communications between folks—including 
lawyers, judges, and legal academics—whose work is related in one way 
or another to law.22 At the present time, out in the “real world,” increasing 
numbers of lawyers involved in handling international legal transactions, 
increasing numbers of judges involved in trying cases with multi-state 
contacts, and increasing numbers of legal academics involved in the 
production of legal scholarship are increasingly “talking law” in English. 
                                                                                                             
 22. Here is a concrete example, one with which I am familiar by personal 
experience. At several recent conferences of l’Association Henri Capitant held 
here in Louisiana on various “civil law” topics, I was granted a dispensation from 
the association’s rule that all presentations be made in French only, so far as my 
facility for speaking (as opposed to reading) French is quite limited, so that I could 
present in English. After I made one of those presentations, several of the 
conference delegates who hailed from countries in which French is not the “first 
language” of the people—notably, the Netherlands and Spain—thanked me for 
presenting in English, noting that, if they could have had their druthers, they, too, 
would have presented in English. This was the reason they gave me: English, not 
French, is their primary “second language,” the one in which they are the most 
fluent. In the conversations among ourselves that followed, we spoke in English 
rather than in French, not only because that was all but necessary for me, but also 
because it was much easier for them.  
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And here’s the truly important thing—the “law” that they are increasingly 
“talking” in English includes the civil law. 
This new “civil law in English,”23 of course, has its own distinctive 
vocabulary. The question is what is the source of such vocabulary. Though 
there are many sources, certainly translations of foreign civil law materials 
into English are at the top of the list. 
For that reason, Professor Levasseur argues, these translations must be 
conducted with a great deal of care and sensitivity. On this score, he 
emphasizes two points in particular: terminological coherence and 
technical precision. First, translations conducted today should take into 
account translations that were conducted in the past and, to the extent 
feasible, should be terminologically consistent with those earlier 
translations. To do otherwise would, in any given case, be to introduce into 
the vocabulary of the civil law in English multiple alternative terms for 
one and the same referent, which would only serve to sow confusion and 
misunderstanding among those who speak that language. “If that were to 
happen,” Professor Levasseur writes: 
[W]e could then be face to face with insoluble conflicts between 
one English legal version . . . [and another] translation . . . in 
another form of the same English language . . . . Would it not be a 
little disconcerting and fatal for the uniformity of certain concepts 
of the civil law if, for example, the translation of . . . the same 
concept of solidarité was “joint and several” in one certain legal 
English version but “solidary” in another English version . . . ?24 
Second, if this new language is to do the job it is called upon to do, 
then it must express civil law concepts with clarity, accuracy, and 
precision. For that reason, translations that incorporate mere 
“approximations,” even if they are “close,” simply will not do. What is 
required, in other words, is authentic translation as opposed to mere 
“paraphrase.” As Professor Levassuer has noted: 
                                                                                                             
 23. Though I have just spoken of the “civil law in English” as a “new” 
language, that language is “new” only in a relative sense, that is, new to the 
English and to most Europeans. As Professor Levasseur correctly points out, a 
“civil law in English” has existed for hundreds of years now. Until recently, 
however, that language was spoken only in a very few, somewhat isolated venues, 
such as Quebec and Louisiana (I will take up this point below in connection with 
my discussion of the first of Professor Levasseur’s “maxims” of translation). 
What is different today is that everyone everywhere is taking up the language. 
 24. Maux des Mots, supra note 3, at 845–46 (Author’s translation). 
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[O]ur translation . . . necessarily had to be cast in “extremely 
precise language. For the law, the essential objective of which is 
to establish a firm order capable of protecting all interests, must 
forcibly seize hold of the social realities and must contain them 
within rather rigid frameworks, so as to avoid, as much as is 
possible, uncertainties and hesitations.”25 
C. The Means of Legal Translation 
Just as Professor Levasseur has written little about what legal 
translation is and what its ends are, so also has he written little about what 
“means” the translator should use in pursuing those ends—the “how to” 
of legal translation. Despite this, in his numerous scholarly works on legal 
translation, he has provided clear indications of what these means are and 
concrete illustrations of how they should be employed. 
Abstracting from these various works of his, one can identify a number 
of “how to” maxims—or if you prefer, “rules of thumb”—that Professor 
Levasseur believes should guide the translator and that have guided him 
in his work as a legal translator. Here, I will present only those that are the 
most obvious, and to my mind, the most important. There are, no doubt, 
still others. 
To appreciate the place that these maxims occupy in the overall 
approach to legal translation that Professor Levasseur has adopted, one 
must recall his conviction that translation is an art, not a science. To look 
at one side of the coin, these maxims cannot be mechanically applied. To 
look at the other side of the coin, applying these maxims always requires 
an exercise of artistic judgment. Sometimes the maxims will point in 
conflicting directions—one indicating the choice of this term and another 
indicating the choice of another. In such an instance, one must choose 
which maxim to follow. Even where all of the maxims point in the same 
direction, the best course may still be to ignore them and, in so doing, 
choose a term that is not indicated at all or perhaps is even contra-
indicated. 
1. Don’t Reinvent the Wheel 
Depending on the time and the circumstances within which a translator 
of legal texts performs his work, he may well find himself on a path that, 
at least in some sense, others have already trod. If that is the case, then 
solely as a matter of efficiency, beginning one’s work by taking a close 
                                                                                                             
 25. Id. at 845 (quoting 3 FRANÇOIS GENY, SCIENCE ET TECHNIQUE 462 
(1922)) (Author’s translation). 
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look at the work of these “others” makes sense. That is particularly so 
where these others might be thought to have some particular expertise in 
performing the translation work in question, for example, a deep 
knowledge of both the legal source language and the legal target language 
and, further, of the legal cultures of which those languages are expressions. 
It is even more so the case if the work of these others has “stood the test 
of time,” that is, has been found workable by those who have used it over 
an extended period of time. 
As Professor Levasseur has rightly noted, anyone who today 
undertakes to transpose the language of the French civil law into English 
finds himself on precisely such a path. To be sure, the French themselves 
are relatively new to this enterprise. But there are others for whom it is 
“old hat.” I have in mind jurists in Quebec and, even more so, jurists in 
Louisiana.26 In both of these cases, the legal system in question 
finds its roots and its foundations in the grand legal traditions of 
the civil law and the common law of which it is the mixed product 
by virtue of its history . . . [and, for that reason,] constitutes an 
ideal laboratory for the evaluation of the possibilities of a mixture 
of legal cultures by the intervention of the expression of these 
legal cultures in two languages [French and English], each 
intimately identified with only one of these two juridical traditions 
[(such as the French civil law)].27  
In each of these jurisdictions, the source language was French and the 
target language English. In the case of Louisiana, the endeavor of creating 
a “civil law in English” out of French legal materials has been met with 
“success.” This success is in the sense of providing a workable legal 
vocabulary of the civil law in English that causes no confusion—for the 
past 200 years.28 
                                                                                                             
 26. Though this is perhaps not so obvious, the Scottish jurists should be added 
to this list as well. It is well known that Scotland is a “mixed” jurisdiction, and 
that its private law is rooted as much in the civil law of Europe as in the common 
law of England. What is not so well known, however, is that Scottish “civil law” 
has significant connections with and has been, at points, heavily influenced by 
French civil law. Vernon Valentine Palmer, Preface, in 6 MIXED JURISDICTIONS 
COMPARED: PRIVATE LAW IN LOUISIANA AND SCOTLAND ix–x (Vernon Valentine 
Palmer & Elspeth Christie Reid eds., 2009). 
 27. Maux des Mots, supra note 3, at 822 (Author’s translation). In context, 
Professor Levasseur, in making this characterization, speaks of the Louisiana 
legal system only. See id. But the characterization fits the legal systems of Quebec 
and Scotland as well. 
 28. Id. at 822. 
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For these reasons, Professor Levasseur, in conducting all of his 
translations of French civil law texts into English, has begun by looking to 
the “brother—or cousin—juridical systems [to the French legal system] 
which have themselves been called either to write their civil codes in 
parallel English–French versions or to translate their law from their national 
juridical language into another juridical language, English in particular.”29 
In so doing, he has discovered among these jurisdictions a sizeable common 
French-to-English lexicon. Citing Quebec and Louisiana, he notes that in 
both jurisdictions, “solidarité” is rendered as “solidarity,” “confusion” as 
“confusion,” “terme” as “term,” and “compensation” as “compensation.”30 
For each of these French civil law terms, Professor Levasseur has 
incorporated precisely these English renderings into his own translations. 
That Professor Levasseur would adopt this maxim—he calls it his “first 
objective”31—for his translation work makes perfectly good sense, given 
the objectives he seeks to achieve through that work. Recall that those 
objectives include meeting the needs of “monolingual” researchers who 
are called upon to conduct research into the meanings of terms used in the 
texts he translates, but who, because they know only English, would be 
limited to English-language civil law materials produced in jurisdictions 
like Quebec or Louisiana. If such a researcher is to have any hope of 
locating the pertinent materials (thanks to the way in which they will have 
been indexed), then the English translation of the French text in question 
must use the terminology that is used in those English-language civil law 
materials that have already been created. Beyond that, recall Professor 
Levasseur’s objective of making a significant and salutary contribution to 
the ongoing development of the “civil law in English.” To that end, the 
translation must be written so as to cohere terminologically with earlier 
translations and, moreover, must be technically precise as opposed to 
merely “approximate.” Using the terminology that has already been used 
in earlier translations in Quebec and Louisiana furthers that goal. 
Regarding accuracy and precision, it seems reasonable to assume that if 
others have already produced a translation that has proven to be workable 
over an extended stretch of time—in the sense that it has been used time 
and again without creating confusion or misunderstanding—then that 
translation is precise enough. 
                                                                                                             
 29. Id. at 841(Author’s translation). 
 30. Id. at 842–43. 
 31. Id. at 841. 
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2. Use “Legal” Cognates and Even “Common Language” Cognates 
in the Target Language, Provided They Are Closely Related in 
Meaning to the Terms of the Source Language 
A “cognate” is a word that is “related” to another “by derivation, 
borrowing, or descent,”32 and as a result, by morphology. Cognates are 
often, though not always, related in meaning. For example, the English word 
“professor,” the French word “professeur,” the Spanish word “professor,” 
the Italian word “professore,” and the Portuguese word “professor” are 
cognates, having ultimately derived from the Latin word “profiteri,” which 
means to “declare publicly.” 
For many legal terms in one language, there are often cognates in other 
languages. The more closely related the languages, the more likely this is 
to be. In many instances, these cognates are, like the terms to be translated, 
legal terms themselves. Examples include the English “contract,” the 
French “contrat,” the Spanish “contrato,” the Italian “contratto,” and the 
Portuguese “contrato.” Among legal cognates such as these, the meanings 
of the terms are almost always closely related to each other. For that 
reason, the choice of such a cognate by a translator is often not only a 
“safe,” but also the “ideal” choice. 
In other instances, however, the cognate is not a legal term at all but 
rather merely an “ordinary” term—a term of the common “everyday” 
language. In many instances, the meanings of cognates of this kind may 
be much the same. Only when their meanings are the same are the cognates 
worthy candidates for use in translation. And they may even be preferable 
where, for whatever reason, either no analogous legal term exists in the 
target language or for some reason the legal term is a less than ideal choice. 
In his work translating French civil law texts into English, Professor 
Levasseur has made frequent use of legal cognates. Beyond that, however, 
he has often had recourse to ordinary cognates. Examples include the very 
terms that, in my explication of the first maxim, we found have been used 
in the English translations of certain French civil law terms in both Quebec 
and Louisiana.  
In each of these instances, Professor Levasseur contends that the close 
relationship between the meaning of the legal French source term on the 
one hand, and the ordinary English cognate on the other, helps to justify 
the choice. As he has stated in defense of his choice of “solidarity” for 
“solidary,” as opposed to the analogous common law term “joint and 
several”: 
                                                                                                             
 32. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 241 (11th ed. 2003). 
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Doesn’t the word “solidarity” exist in the ordinary, common, usual 
English language? We can read the following definition in 
Webster’s New World Dictionary (not a legal dictionary!) of 
solidarity: “combination or agreement of all elements or 
individuals, as of a group; complete unity, as of opinion, purpose, 
interest, feeling, etc.[].” Notice the simple, common words 
“agreement of all individuals” and “complete unity, as of purpose, 
interest”; aren’t these word fitting perfectly the civil law 
understanding of “solidarity”? So why resort to the common law 
words of “joint” and “several” which are referring to concepts 
with different legal regimes and different legal effects from the 
regime and effects of ‘solidarité’?33 
The same could be said of the other common ordinary English cognates he 
has chosen to use: “confusion,” which means the act of mixing up disparate 
things;34 “term,” which means “limited and definite extent of time”—
particularly “the time for which something lasts”;35 and “compensation,” 
which can mean “to offset” or “counterbalanc[e].”36 In each case, the 
meaning of the ordinary English cognate matches the meaning of the 
translated French legal term well. 
Given the objectives at which Professor Levasseur has taken aim in 
his translation work, it is no surprise that he has adopted this second 
maxim. First, this maxim furthers his objective of assisting the multiligual 
jurist who finds himself needing to conduct research into the meanings of 
terms used in a translated French text. He makes this point in relation to 
the translation of “solidarite”: 
Thus, if, for example, we translate the word “solidarité” by 
“solidarity,” this jurist, starting from the word of the current 
English-language word “solidarity,” but a word [also] intentionally 
juridicized under the same word “solidarity” so as to become the 
juridical equivalent of “solidarité” in the civil law, could very easily 
find “solidarité” in the index of a work of French or Quebec 
doctrine. His research into French law or Quebec law would then 
                                                                                                             
 33. Ruminations, supra note 3 (manuscript at 2); see also Approach, supra 
note 3, at xiv (singing the praises of the “common ordinary English word 
‘solidarity’”). 
 34. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 32, at 
262 (defining “confusion” and “confuse”). 
 35. Id. at 1289. 
 36. Id. at 253. 
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be teleguided and would conduct him logically and directly to his 
objective.37 
The same is clearly true of the cognate terms “confusion,” “term,” and 
“compensation”: for the researchers in question, these terms have the same 
kind of research-directing utility as does “solidarity.” 
 Second, this maxim, when judiciously applied, also furthers Professor 
Levasseur’s objective of making a worthwhile contribution to the ongoing 
development of the “civil law in English.” As we have seen, one measure 
of what is worthwhile in this context is “coherence”—that is, that the 
translation be consistent in terminology with prior translations. So far as 
prior translations of French civil law terms into English, in particular, 
those conducted by translators in Quebec and Louisiana, have relied 
heavily on cognates, the use of cognates by the contemporary translator 
will tend to promote the desired consistency. Further, because these 
cognate-heavy translations of the Quebeckers and Louisianans have been 
used successfully, causing neither confusion nor misunderstanding for 
many years now, there is at least some reason to believe that contemporary 
translations that employ these same cognates will be accurate and precise. 
As we have seen, these contemporary translations must be characterized 
by accuracy and precision if they are to contribute positively to the 
ongoing development of the “civil law in English.” 
3. Look Out for “False Friends” 
“False friends” (in French, “faux amis”) is the term of art used by 
linguists to refer to words in one language that bear a morphological 
resemblance to words in another language but that do not actually have the 
same meanings. A classic “common language” example is “sensible,” 
which means “reasonable” in English but “sensitive” in both French and 
Spanish. 
When translating from one legal language into another, one commonly 
encounters a number of these faux amis. Professor Levasseur’s favorite 
example is the French term “bonne foi,”38 the literal English translation of 
which is “good faith.”39 Noting that the translators of both the Louisiana 
                                                                                                             
 37. Maux des Mots, supra note 3, at 843 (Author’s translation). 
 38. Id. at 848–51; L’art de la Traduction, supra note 2, at 36–37. 
 39. Another good example, one that is much easier to explain than the 
example of “bonne foi,” is “l’execution du contract,” which literally translated 
would be “the execution of the contract.” For most English-speaking common 
lawyers, the primary signification of “execute” when used in connection with 
“contract” is to “create,” to “establish,” to “enter into,” or, still more concretely, 
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Digest of 1808 and the current Quebec Civil Code contented themselves 
with just this translation, Professor Levasseur offers this critical 
assessment of that choice: 
It would appear that the translator ought to have no problem 
translating bonne foi by good faith and that a common law jurist 
ought to feel at ease discussing this concept with his civilian 
colleague, during, say, the negotiation of a contract. Nevertheless, 
these two jurists will very quickly discover that the English language 
in current use and, in part, the juridical language of the common law 
has led them into error.40 
The cause of this error, as Professor Levasseur goes on to explain, is that 
the “bonne foi” of the civil law and the “good faith” of the common law 
have rather different significations.41 
Professor Levasseur founds his defense of this “different 
significations” thesis on two sources: first, official commentary on the 
Article of the Principles of the European Law of Contract that pertains to 
“good faith” and, second, well-known commentary on the common law of 
contracts. Regarding the former, he writes: 
[A] commentary . . . under Article 1:201 of the Principles [states] 
that “In English, good faith designates a state of mind: the will to 
act honestly and equitably; it is a subjective notion . . . . Fair 
dealing signifies the fact of acting with loyalty; it is an objective 
criterion.” . . . And the “note” under this article 1:201 adds, in the 
same order of ideas, that “the principle of good faith is recognized 
or at least observed in all of the countries of the European Union 
to the extent that it defines a model of contractual conduct. There 
is nevertheless a considerable difference between the different 
legal systems in that which concerns the extent and the force of 
penetration of the principle. An . . . extreme situation is constituted 
by the legal systems (English and Irish) that do not recognize a 
general duty of the parties to conform themselves to good faith but 
which, in numerous hypothetical cases, reach, thanks to particular 
rules, results that good faith also imposes. . . . The Common law 
                                                                                                             
to “draw up” and to “sign.” For French-speaking civil lawyers, however, the 
primary signification of “execution” in this context is that of “carrying out” or to 
“perform.” 
 40. Maux des Mots, supra note 3, at 849 (Author’s translation); see also L’art 
de la Traduction, supra note 2, at 36. 
 41. Maux des Mots, supra note 3, at 849–50; L’art de la Traduction, supra 
note 2, at 36–37. 
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of England and Ireland do not recognize any general obligation to 
act in conformity with the requirements of good faith in the 
performance of the contract.”42 
And these are his remarks on the common law of contracts: 
The English authors Cheshire and Fifoot devote only three-
quarters of a page to “good faith” and, from the outset, pose this 
question: “Do the parties owe to each other reciprocally a duty to 
negotiate in good faith? . . . are they duty-bound to perform the 
contract in good faith?” Their response, as brief as is their 
treatment of good faith, is the following: “up until recently, 
English jurists would not even pose these questions or, if they 
posed them, they would have responded somewhat cavalierly ‘of 
course not.’” In “The Law of Contract” by [English common law 
scholar G.H.] Treitel, good faith does not even appear in the index. 
. . . The great American comparativist who has recently died, 
Allan Farnsworth, wrote that the “concept of good faith plays a 
fundamental role in the law of contract of the civilian legal system. 
. . . English law, in opposition to the civilians, categorically 
refuses to recognize such a duty of good faith. The common 
lawyers at the meeting of UNCITRAL,43 ill at ease with the 
civilians’ relatively vague and vast concept of good faith in the 
performance of contracts, refused to include in the Vienna 
Convention a disposition that imposed good faith in the 
performance of obligations. The civilians stood their ground, 
determined to make their point of view prevail [and ultimately 
succeeded] . . . .”44 
Boiled down to its essentials, then, the difference between civil law “good 
faith” and common law “good faith” can be stated as follows: “[T]he law 
of the common law makes a distinction between ‘good faith’ and ‘fair 
dealing,’ whereas in the French civil law tradition the principle of ‘bonne 
foi’ is more equivalent to the ‘duty of loyalty,’ [that is,] ‘fair dealing’ under 
the law of the common law.”45 
For these reasons, Professor Levasseur insists that it is “difficult[], 
indeed, impossibl[e]” for his two hypothetical jurists—the one English-
                                                                                                             
 42. Maux des Mots, supra note 3, at 849 (Author’s translation); see also L’art 
de la Traduction, supra note 2, at 36. 
 43. Acronym for “United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.” 
 44. Maux des Mots, supra note 3, at 850 (Author’s translation); see also L’art 
de la Traduction, supra note 2, at 36–37. 
 45. Maux des Mots, supra note 3, at 849 (Author’s translation). 
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speaking and employing the term “good faith,” the other French-speaking 
and employing the term “bonne foi”—“to understand each other.”46 Thus, 
“good faith” is a less than optimal rendering of “bonne foi.” What would 
be a better rendering? Professor Levasseur answers that question with 
another, this one rhetorical: “Should one then translate the ‘bonne foi’ of 
the civilian by the ‘good faith and fair dealing’ of the common law so as 
to be sure to communicate all of the cultural content of bonne foi?”47 
Professor Levasseur’s use of this maxim of interpretation—avoid false 
friends—finds its justification in his objective of making a positive 
contribution to the development of the “civil law in English.” Whatever 
else such a positive contribution might be, it should be one that is laser-
fire accurate and precise. Now, imagining any move in legal translation 
that could have a more deleterious effect on accuracy and precision than 
the use of a false friend is difficult; indeed, false friends are, by definition, 
inaccurate and imprecise. If the goal is to build up the “civil law in 
English” well, then English translations of foreign language civil law texts 
must steer wide and clear of them. 
4. Use Equivalents, Especially “Rough Equivalents,” with Extreme 
Caution 
An “equivalent” of a term in one language is a term in another 
language, that, though different from the former in etymology and 
morphology—in other words, the terms are not cognates—still has more 
or less the same meaning.48 A simple common language example is the 
English term “book” and the French term “livre.” 
In many cases, the use of equivalents in legal translation raises no 
concerns whatsoever. Professor Levasseur himself has made considerable 
use of equivalents in his own translation work. For example, he has 
rendered the French civil law term “vente” by means of the equivalent 
English common law term “sale”; the French civil law term “rente,” as 
used in the expression “rente viagère,” by means of the equivalent English 
common law term “annuity”; and the French civil law term “propriété” by 
means of the equivalent English common law term “ownership.” 
But there are other cases in which the equivalent makes for a less than 
ideal translation choice, Professor Levasseur argues. Abstracting from his 
writings on this matter, one can identify at least three such cases. 
                                                                                                             
 46. Id. (Author’s translation). 
 47. Id. (Author’s translation). 
 48. See 5 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 359 (2d ed. 1992) (definition B.2). 
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The first case is that in which the term of the source language in 
question has cognates in languages other than the target language—
languages that may perhaps be more closely related to the source language 
than is the target language. Those cognates are themselves legal terms used 
in the law of the jurisdictions in which those languages are spoken. 
Oftentimes, scholars working in those other languages will have produced 
works, using those cognates that explain the common legal concept behind 
them. When that is the case, as Professor Levasseur correctly notes, using 
the target language equivalent to render that term may produce problems 
for his “first class of researchers”—the multilinguals.49 The equivalent 
term—precisely because it is an equivalent and not a cognate—will not 
point the way to that research. 
The second case where an equivalent is not an ideal choice is that in 
which the term of the source language in question has a cognate in the 
target language, earlier translators chose to render the term using that 
cognate rather than the target language equivalent, and legal scholars, 
working in the target language, have already produced works using this 
cognate that explain the concept behind the term. When that is the case, as 
Professor Levasseur rightly observes, using the target language equivalent 
to render that term may produce problems for his “second class of 
researchers”—the monolinguals.50 In this case as in the first, the equivalent 
term is an obstacle, not an aid, to legal research. 
The third and final case, which is rather different from the other two, 
is that in which the equivalent of the term to be translated is simply “too 
rough” an equivalent to do the job. In other words, the variation in 
meanings between the term to be translated and its equivalent is just “too 
great.” Determining when the equivalent is “too rough,” as Professor 
Levasseur acknowledges, is a “judgment call.” But he offers some helpful 
guidance for making that call. First, if the scope of the equivalent and that 
of the term to be translated are notably different—for example, if one 
covers a range of legal phenomena (legal facts or acts) that the other does 
not—then the equivalent may not be the best choice. Second, an equivalent 
whose meaning is uncertain—for example, where the term is vague or 
ambiguous or polysemic—should probably be avoided. Third, if the 
equivalent has a cognate in the target language, the meaning of which is 
                                                                                                             
 49. Recall that “multilinguals” are those who, after reading the translation in 
the target language, might have needed to research the concept behind the term 
by looking to scholarly works that have been written in one of those other 
languages, works that may use cognates. 
 50. Recall that “monolinguals” are those who, after reading the translation in 
the target language, might have needed to research the concept behind the term 
by looking to those scholarly works that have already been written in the target 
language. 
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significantly different from that of the term to be translated, the equivalent 
should almost certainly not be used. Finally, if concepts that lie behind the 
two terms—the term to be translated and its equivalent—have fundamentally 
different natures because each, within the distinctive legal culture of which it 
is a part, has undergone a radically different line of conceptual development 
over the course of its history than has the other, then the translator might be 
well-advised to find a substitute for the equivalent. 
Of the dangers posed by the use of equivalents in these three kinds of 
cases, Professor Levasseur offers up two examples: the rendering of the 
French civil law term “violence” as the common law term “duress” and 
that of the French civil law term “solidaire”—adjectival form of 
“solidarité”—as the common law term “joint and several.”  
a. “Violence” as “Duress” 
The first example involves the translation of “violence” into “duress.” 
One cannot deny that some affinity exists between the French civil law 
term “violence” and the common law term “duress.” No one who has 
studied both the French law of contracts and the common law of contracts 
could possibly fail to notice the relationship between the two: the content 
of the underlying concepts is similar (overbearing of the will of a 
contracting party) and the effects of the two institutions are largely the 
same (in the civil law, some kind of “nullity”; in the common law, some 
kind of “voidness”). For that reason, the two terms are rightly treated as at 
least “rough” equivalents.  
Even so, Professor Levasseur rightly maintains that “duress” is less 
than the ideal choice—indeed, is a poor choice—for rendering “violence.” 
The common law concept of “duress,” as he correctly notes, 
has greatly evolved in the course of the last decades so as to pass 
from the use of force or of the threat of use of force with the 
intention of causing some physical harm to the person of the co-
contracting party to [include] illegal threats to . . . cause some 
economic or financial harm to a co-contracting party. [Therefore,] 
the essential compositional element of the notion of duress is the 
recourse to physical force or to threats of having recourse to 
physical force. The common law qualifies this element as coercion 
which must cause the co-contracting party to be afraid, [that is,] 
that he be conscious of the fact that he contracts under the 
influence of fear and not of error.51 
                                                                                                             
 51. Maux des Mots, supra note 3, at 852 (Author’s translation). 
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The French civil law concept of “violence” certainly includes all of this, 
but also includes a good bit more: 
[S]ituations that . . . would be qualified as [involving] harm of a 
moral [or psychological] order or moral [or psychological] 
constraint, as is the case with “persons who, be it naturally or be 
it when they find themselves in certain particular circumstances, 
present a certain peculiar weakness and can easily be victims of 
unscrupulous co-contracting parties.” . . . [S]ituations where there 
would be no threat of recourse to physical force but simply a 
power of persuasion by one party over another because of the fact 
that one party is in a position of economic dependence vis-à-vis 
the other party or in a position of domination by one over the 
other.52 
As Professor Levasseur correctly notes, when the common law tradition 
decided that victims of these “non-threatening” situations should also be 
protected against the overbearing of their wills, the “equity courts” were 
tasked with devising the new concept of “undue influence” to do the job, 
inasmuch as the concept of “duress,” limited as it was, could not do so.53 
For these reasons, Professor Levasseur argues, some word other than 
“duress” must be found to render “violence.” In his view: 
[Translating “violence” as “duress” constitutes] at once a betrayal 
of the concept of violence which is known to the civilian and of 
the concept of duress which is familiar to the common law jurist. 
In order to be as close as possible to the legal tenor of the concept 
of violence in the civil law, the translator would have to associate 
duress to undue influence by creating a single concept on the basis 
                                                                                                             
 52. Id. at 852–53 (Author’s translation). 
 53. L’art de la Traduction, supra note 2, at 39; see also Maux des Mots, supra 
note 3, at 852–53. There is a second problem with rendering “violence” as 
“duress,” one that, though left unmentioned by Professor Levasseur, still supports 
his position. That problem is a difference in legal effects. Under the civil law of 
France (as under that of Louisiana), the sanction for “violence” is the “relative 
nullity” of the contract, a civil law term that corresponds, at least roughly, to the 
common law term “voidable.” Under the common law, by contrast, the sanction 
for “duress” is sometimes that the contract is “voidable,” but at other times that 
the contract is “void,” a common law term that corresponds, at least roughly, to 
the civil law term “absolutely null.” What makes the difference at common law is 
the severity of the duress. 
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of these two words of the legal vocabulary of the common law [for 
example, “undue threats/influence”].54 
Professor Levasseur does not, however, recommend such a course of 
action. To the contrary, following his first and second rules of thumb, he 
proposes using the ordinary English cognate term “violence,” which is 
precisely the same term that has always been and still is used in Quebec55 
and was used in Louisiana from 1808 to 1984.56 
b. “Solidaire” as “Joint and Several” 
If Professor Levasseur, in his capacity as legal linguist, has a bete 
noire, it is the translation of the French term “solidaire” as “joint and 
several.” On every occasion on which he has written about legal 
translation—including even the piece that concerns translating the law of 
“procedure”—he has not merely spoken against, but often passionately 
denounced this translative faux pas. 
Even Professor Levasseur, however, would acknowledge that such a 
translation is not entirely without merit. There are, after all, undeniable 
linkages between the two terms, especially in the effects that the respective 
legal institutions which they express produce. For example, whether it’s a 
case of “solidary” debtors under French civil law or of “joint and several” 
debtors under common law, the creditor can demand payment of the entire 
debt from any one or more of the debtors. 
But “entirely without merit” is one thing and “ideal” quite another. 
And in Professor Levasseur’s view, the translation in question—“joint and 
several” for “solidaire”—is far from the ideal. He offers several reasons 
in support of this opinion. 
Part of the problem lies in the constituent elements of the composite 
term—“joint and several”—that is, in “joint” and in “several.” In the 
course of the historical development of the common law, each of these 
terms has become polysemic—in other words, has acquired multiple 
meanings. On this score, Professor Levasseur quotes at length and with 
approval the account of these multiple meanings that was once penned by 
the great Louisiana jurist Justice Albert Tate: 
                                                                                                             
 54. Maux des Mots, supra note 3, at 853 (Author’s translation); see also L’art 
de la Traduction, supra note 2, at 39. 
 55. Maux des Mots, supra note 3, at 851, 853. 
 56. Id. at 851. 
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[T]he common-law concepts of “joint” and of “several” obligation 
differ distinctively from the Louisiana concepts denoted by the 
identical terms. 
 
The several obligation of the common law could not only be the 
legally independent promises of two obligors to perform separate 
and distinct acts (as with the several obligor of the Louisiana civil 
law); it could also denote separate promises by two obligors for 
the same performance (as in the Louisiana solidary obligation). 
The joint obligation of the common law referred primarily to the 
ancient necessity to join all joint obligors in the same suit to 
enforce the obligation (as with Louisiana joint obligors); but it 
also included the concept that all joint obligors could each be 
bound for the entire performance to the obligee (rather than only 
for his proportional part, as with the Louisiana joint obligor).57 
To render a French civil law term by means of a common law equivalent, 
the meaning of which is as confused as are those of “joint” and “several,” 
Professor Levasseur maintains, is to translate badly. 
On top of this problem of polysemism, Professor Levasseur notes 
another issue: for each of these terms, one of its variant significations is 
fundamentally different from that of the correlative French or English civil 
law cognate or equivalent. Consider, for example, “joint” in the sense that 
each of the “joint debtors” is bound for the entire debt to the creditor (the 
second sense of “joint” in the order enumerated by Justice Tate). In the 
civil law, the cognate of “joint,” which is “conjointe” in France and 
Quebec or simply “joint” in Louisiana, has a very different connotation. 
Indeed, one might say the opposite sense, for a “conjoint obligor” is bound 
only for his portion of the entire debt.58 Next, consider “several” in the 
sense of “several obligors” who make separate promises to pay the same 
debt (the first sense of “several” in the order enumerated by Justice Tate). 
In the civil law, “several,” which is “separé” (or “separatim”), does not 
mean this at all, but rather something very different: in “obligations 
separées,” each obligor is liable separately from the others to pay a debt 
that is distinctive from that of the others.59 In Professor Levasseur’s 
sensible opinion, to translate a French civil law term by means of a 
                                                                                                             
 57. Wilks v. Allstate Ins. Co., 195 So. 2d 390, 397 (La. Ct. App. 1967) 
(citations omitted). Professor Levasseur quotes this passage from Wilks in two of 
his pieces. Maux des Mots, supra note 3, at 858; L’art de la Traduction, supra 
note 2, at 40. 
 58. Maux des Mots, supra note 3, at 856–57. 
 59. Id. at 857–58. 
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common law equivalent that itself has a civil law cognate or equivalent 
and beyond that, one that means the opposite of the original French civil 
law term, is to invite confusion and for that reason alone is undesirable.  
These problems are not solved simply by cumulating the two terms in 
the composite formula “joint and several,” Professor Levasseur contends. 
To the contrary, the problems are to some degree exacerbated. That is 
because, depending upon which sense of each term one takes, the 
conjunction of the two can produce a contradiction. On this point, he 
quotes with approval from the Private Law Dictionary and Lexicons of the 
Quebec Research Center of Private and Comparative Law: 
[T]he union of the words joint and several is a contradiction in 
terms. In fact, “joint obligations” like “several obligations” are 
obligations in which several debtors are bound among themselves, 
but in the “joint” obligation, one debtor is bound to execute his 
part or portion of the obligation, whereas in the obligation called 
“several” each of the debtors is bound to perform the totality of 
the obligation.60 
Professor Levasseur maintains—and on this point, no rational person 
could disagree—that self-contradictions do not make for ideal translations. 
Even if all of these problems with using “joint and several” to render 
“solidaire”—the problems of polysemism and multiple contradictions at 
multiple levels—could be brushed aside, that choice would still remain 
problematic, Professor Levasseur insists, because of a reason that is far 
more fundamental than the others. That reason has to do with what might 
be called the natures or conceptualizations—of the concepts that lie behind 
the respective terms “solidaire” and “joint and several.” These are natures 
that, in the case of each of the terms, have been shaped by the unique 
historical development of each concept within the distinctive legal culture 
of which it is a part. According to Professor Levasseur: 
A comparativist jurist wells knows that . . . solidarity is an institution 
of the substantive civilian subjective law or a “determinative” right 
and is not at all the equivalent of “joint and several” which forms a 
part of the sanctionative law, the law of the second degree, the law of 
procedure and of the courts.61 
Expanded somewhat, his point is this: on the common law side, the 
terms “joint,” “several,” and “joint and several” all grew out of the English 
                                                                                                             
 60. L’art de la Traduction, supra note 2, at 40 (Author’s translation); see also 
Maux des Mots, supra note 3, at 858 n.122. 
 61. Réflexions, supra note 3, at 11 (Author’s translation). 
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law of procedure that was concerned with who must be joined in a 
lawsuit—what would now be called the law of joinder. Those involved in 
the development of these notions gave little, if any, thought to the 
substantive legal relationship obtained by the persons to be joined or the 
substantive legal rights enjoyed by the “joiner” (in this case, the creditor) or 
the substantive legal duties that weighed on those who had to be or might be 
joined (in this case, the debtors). And because no thought was given to these 
matters, these matters never entered into the conceptualization of the 
concepts represented by these terms.62 On the French civil law side, things 
were much different. The term “solidarité” was always a part of the 
substantive law and had no procedural denotation or connotation. Built into 
the conceptualization of this term, then, were very precise notions of the 
substantive relationship among the debtors, of the substantive right of the 
creditor, and of the substantive duty of the debtors,63 but not at all any 
notion of which debtors may or must be joined in the creditor’s suit. 
In Professor Levasseur’s view, terms that are this different from each 
other in terms of their historically and culturally conditioned “natures” 
should not be used to render each other in translation. Doing so, he insists, 
is fraught with many dangers. Speaking in particular of the case of 
translation of French civil law concepts into English, he writes: 
We consider that there would be a great danger for the integrity of 
the civil law if it were to be expressed in an English language that 
would keep its distance vis-à-vis the juridical concepts of the civil 
law by introducing some juridical concepts of the common law. 
That would inevitably lead to some insoluble conflicts . . . . In 
addition, another great danger would present itself under the form 
of a common law doctrine and a common law jurisprudence that 
                                                                                                             
 62. In this respect, the concept behind the expression “joint and several” is 
very much part and parcel of the legal culture of the common law tradition in all 
of its distinctiveness. Regarding the cultural distinctiveness of that tradition, 
Professor Levasseur has written these words: 
It is known that the juridical culture of the common law, since its 
formation on the job, on the ground, with its itinerant judges and, above 
all, . . . [its] writ system . . . , is a culture of procedure that is extremely 
technical, mechanical, indeed, rigid and very complex. . . . This explains 
why the legal language of the common law has been and still remains a 
language of procedure and of the “trial” and why the common lawyer is, 
before all else, a technician of procedure within the nets of which he 
seeks to immobilize the adverse party. 
Id. at 13 (Author’s translation). 
 63. See L’art de la Traduction, supra note 2, at 39 (“For the Louisiana civil 
law, solidarity is concept of the substantive law.” (Author’s translation)). 
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would easily find respectability, for they could then present 
themselves as imitators of their French civilian pairs so as to be 
substituted for the these pairs in the eyes and in the minds of all of 
those would could neither read nor understand the civil law in his 
original and natural language . . . .64 
“The danger of the repetition of such errors (which are fundamental because 
they betray the legal cultures of the two languages in question . . .),” he 
further writes, “is that, by being repeated, these errors will acquire the force 
of law under the form of jurisprudence constante or under the form of a 
precedent for our common law friends.”65 
This methodological maxim—beware analogous legal terms that are 
mere “rough equivalents”—dovetails with Professor Levasseur’s objectives 
in legal translation. Consider his special objective of facilitating legal 
research into the meanings of the terms used in the French legal texts he 
has translated. Speaking in particular of the needs of his hypothetical 
“monolingual” researchers, he states: 
The notion and layman’s word solidarité is, by tradition, civilian. 
The standard translation of this French word . . . is under the 
common law terminology of the combined words “joint and 
several.” Query: Where would an English-monolingual researcher 
. . . go to find the civil law understanding of “solidarité” if the only 
access key available to him/her is “joint and several”? What 
becomes of his access to the scholarly writings in English on the 
civil law (particularly by Louisiana civil law scholars) when all of 
these writings use “solidarity” and not “joint and several.” Our 
“English only or mostly” researcher will be left without any access 
to all of these civil law writings which are available. 
 
The same is true of the civil law word and notion “confusion.” In 
the hands of common law lawyers, “confusion” becomes “merger.” 
If a researcher is only give the entry “merger,” he will be led to do 
. . . his research in “corporate law,” in the law of “mergers and 
acquisitions,”[66] but definitely not in the “discipline or field of the 
                                                                                                             
 64. L’art de la Traduction, supra note 2, at 35 (Author’s translation); see also 
Maux des Mots, supra note 3, at 846. 
 65. Réflexions, supra note 3, at 11 (Author’s translation). 
 66. “In the American legal vocabulary, the word ‘merger’ would be 
equivalent to fusion (corporate merger or fusion of corporations) and not 
‘confusion’ in the sense of the Civil Code.” Maux des Mots, supra note 3, at 837 
n.45 (Author’s translation). 
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civil law.” As a result, the researcher will entirely miss the 
scholarly writings in English that have been devoted to the topic 
of and appear under the heading of “confusion.”67 
Though I do not believe that Professor Levasseur has ever himself 
made this observation, the use of “rough equivalents” of the target 
language could also interfere with research by his hypothetical English-
language reader who can read French or some other “civil law” language. 
Consider the case of an English lawyer reading through an English 
translation of a French legal text in which “obligation solidaire” has been 
translated as “joint and several obligation,” the concept underlying which 
happens to be the very one that he needs to research. Because he can read 
Spanish, he runs off to José Manresa’s magisterial commentary on the 
Spanish Civil Code, pulls out the index, and looks for something that 
strikes him as corresponding in Spanish to “joint and several,” such as 
“conjunto y diverso.” What does he find? Absolutely nothing. And why 
not? Because the material he is seeking is indexed under “solidarias.” The 
undeniable bottom line is this—using equivalents of the target language to 
render terms in the source language will often be a research stopper. 
This maxim also furthers Professor Levasseur’s other special 
objective—to help build up a technically accurate and precise “civil law 
in English.” Like “false friends,” “rough equivalent” translations—
especially when they are “too rough”—undermine accuracy and precision. 
This is because they produce merely “approximate” translations at best 
and “paraphrase” at worst. If the objective is a translation that hits the 
bull’s eye in terms of meaning, then “rough” is simply not good enough. 
III. CRITICAL EVALUATION 
To my knowledge, no jurist anywhere has offered up any criticism 
whatsoever of Professor Levasseur’s approach to translation, at least not 
in its broad outlines. That is to be expected, as his approach—again, in its 
broad outlines—is what one might call “mainstream” and thus largely 
uncontroversial. His understanding of the relationship between legal 
language and legal culture, of what legal translations is, of what the ends 
of legal translation are, and of the appropriate means for realizing those 
ends is shared by nearly everyone in the field. 
That does not mean, however, that Professor Levasseur’s work as a 
legal linguist has not been criticized. At least some aspects have been 
criticized. But that criticism has been focused not so much on his method 
itself as on his application of that method, in particular, his application of 
                                                                                                             
 67. Approach, supra note 3, at xiv.  
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maxim number four—beware analogous legal terms that are mere “rough 
equivalents”—especially in connection with his application of maxim 
number two—use “legal” cognates and even “common language” 
cognates, provided they are closely related in meaning to the terms to be 
translated.68 
The criticism to which I refer is directed against the rejection by 
Professor Levasseur of “joint and several” as a suitable translation for 
“solidaire”—for which he prefers the cognate “solidary”—and to a lesser 
extent, of “duress” as a suitable translation for “violence”—for which he 
prefers the cognate “violence.” In one case as in the other, the critics 
charge, Professor Levasseur’s proposed translations fail to perform what 
is the most basic function of legal translation for them: to communicate to 
the reader, immediately and without delay, the substance of the meaning 
of the translated term. As the critics correctly note, neither “solidary” nor 
“violence” is a technical legal term in the language of the common law, 
which is to say that, as far as English legal language is concerned, they are 
neologisms. For that reason, the critics say, a common law lawyer, judge, 
or scholar reading an English translation of a French legal text in which 
“solidaire” is rendered as “solidary” or “violence” as “violence” would 
have no immediate idea what the original text means. To the contrary, to 
get some such idea, the reader would have to drop the translation for a 
moment and run off to conduct some sort of research, if indeed the reader 
would have any idea where to start. On the other hand, if that same reader 
were to read “joint and several” (for “solidaire”) or “duress” (for 
“violence”) in his English translation, then he or she would have some 
idea, right away and without any need for further research, of what the 
original text means. Yes, the critics admit, this idea would be only 
“approximate” because, as they also admit and for the same reasons 
Professor Levasseur has elucidated, “joint and several” is not the “perfect 
equivalent” of “solidaire” and “duress” is not the “perfect equivalent” of 
“violence.” Still, the critics insist, “joint and several” and “duress” are 
close enough in meaning to “solidaire” and “violence,” respectively, to do 
the job. 
Though reasonable minds may perhaps differ on this point, I find this 
criticism unpersuasive for two reasons. First, though some “research” 
might be required for the common law reader to make sense of terms like 
                                                                                                             
 68. Some of this criticism, one must acknowledge, might be understood to go 
so far as to constitute a challenge to maxim number four. My impression, however, 
is that the elements of the criticism that might lend themselves to this understanding 
are in fact hyperbole uttered in the heat of polemical battle. Surely no one can object 
to maxim number four in the abstract. The real point of contention can therefore 
only be over how that rule is to be applied. 
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“solidary” or “violence” that he or she might find in a translation of a 
French legal text, that research could hardly be considered onerous or 
time-consuming. As I was writing up this part of this Essay, I decided to 
take a break to conduct a little experiment: sitting here in my study, with 
nothing at hand but my laptop to help me, how long would it take me to 
get a good idea of what “solidary obligation” means? So I got online, 
opened up “Google,” and typed in “solidary obligation.” At the head of 
the results, which were available to me in 0.49 seconds, I found a 
dictionary-type definition of “solidary obligation”—one that was fairly 
good as far as it went. I then “clicked” on the first result—a Wikipedia 
entry for “solidary obligation.” There then instantly opened up a page that 
provided a detailed, but manageably brief, account of the institution of 
solidarity—based, interestingly enough, mainly on Louisiana law source 
materials—that covered not only the concept itself but also most of its 
legal effects. I have to believe that our hypothetical common law reader, 
upon reviewing the information included on this webpage, would have in 
very short order gained a good grasp of “solidary obligation” and would 
have come away saying to himself, “Well, this is a lot like my ‘joint and 
several obligation’ in many ways, but in some other ways, subtly 
different.” And that, of course, is precisely the result to which Professeur 
Levasseur, through his rendering of “solidaire,” would want to lead his 
reader. 
Second, though the translations touted by the critics—“duress” for 
“violence” and “joint and several” for “solidaire”—might be sufficient for 
some purposes, they are simply incapable of achieving the objectives that 
Professor Levasseur has set for his work of legal translation. Consider the 
first objective: facilitating legal research by the reader. As demonstrated 
earlier, translation filled with non-cognate, rough equivalent renderings 
like “duress” and “joint and several” will lead that reader to a blind alley. 
Consider the second objective: making a coherent, technically accurate, 
and precise contribution to the ongoing development of the “civil law in 
English.” Again, I have already shown beyond any doubt that a translation 
filled with non-cognate, rough equivalent renderings offers its users terms 
that, because they are approximations, fall short of providing the degree 
of technical accuracy and precision that speakers of the “civil law in 
English” require. For example, if some English lawyer, perhaps kicked 
back in his study somewhere in Oxford, sipping his evening brandy, just 
wants a “general idea” of what this or that passage in the French Civil 
Code means, then a duress-and-joint-and-several type translation—in 
other words, a paraphrase—will probably be good enough. If, on the other 
hand, an English lawyer in London who, in relation to some matter that 
arises at work, needs to know precisely what that same passage means so 
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that he can complete that work and cannot gain that knowledge without 
conducting some research, then a paraphrase will simply not suffice. Not 
only will the paraphrase fail to point the lawyer in the right direction with 
respect to that research, but it may also leave him or her with a false—at 
least in the sense of not being completely accurate—impression of the 
meaning of the passage. Professor Levasseur has designed his translations 
for precisely such “serious” (as opposed to “casual”) readers of French 
civil law texts—readers who need to conduct research or need to get at the 
precise sense of the original French text. 
With that, we have taken care of the only criticism that, to my 
knowledge, has ever been lodged against Professor Levasseur’s approach to 
legal translation. But that, however, is not necessarily the end of the matter. 
Alongside the first group of critics, whose position might be characterized 
by saying that they believe Professor Levasseur has gone too far in his 
applications of the second and fourth maxims, it is possible to imagine 
another group of critics, very much opposed to the first, whose position 
might be characterized by saying that they believe he has not gone far 
enough. The charge, in short, would be this: Professor Levasseur has 
sometimes settled for a “rough” common law equivalent when he should 
instead have found some alternative, perhaps a cognate. Two possible 
illustrations spring to mind. 
To render the French civil law term “bail,” Professor Levasseur has 
chosen the English common law equivalent “lease.” One might question 
this choice on the ground that in terms of their respective natures (or 
conceptualizations), bail and lease are very different beasts because each 
has undergone, within the distinctive legal system in which it came to be, 
a very different historical development from the other. Though there are 
other differences—for example, differences in legal effects—the most 
profound and perhaps best known is as follows: whereas bail creates 
between the parties what a civilian would call merely “personal” rights, 
lease creates between the parties what a civilian would call “real” rights. 
In other words, whereas lease gives the lessee a right in the thing leased, 
bail does not. It could be argued, then, that “lease” is simply “too rough” 
an equivalent of “bail,” and for that reason some other rendering should 
be found.69 
                                                                                                             
 69. The reader may be surprised that, in conjuring up the case against 
rendering “bail” as “lease,” I did not include something along the lines of “such a 
rendering could interfere with the research that some of the researchers with 
whom Professor Levasseur is concerned—the multilinguists—might have wished 
to conduct in other foreign civil law languages.” That is because, in this instance, 
that argument will not fly, because the terms used in those other languages to 
render “bail” are not cognates but equivalents of it: in Spanish, “arriendo”; in 
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In translating the French civil law term “société,” Professor Levasseur 
has chosen the English common law equivalent “partnership.” This choice 
can be challenged, first of all, on the same ground as can the choice of 
“lease” for “bail,” namely, that the two have rather different natures or 
conceptualizations. In addition, the choice can be challenged on at least 
two other grounds. First, the two terms are different in terms of scope and, 
beyond that, “société” is, depending on how one chooses to look at it, 
either ambiguous or polysemic. In the common law, a sharp distinction—
in terms not only of conceptualization, but also and even more so in terms 
of effects—is drawn between partnerships and corporations. Depending 
on how it is used and the context, the French civil law term “société” may 
refer to either a partnership or to a corporation or to both at the same time. 
Professor Levasseur’s own rendition of that term in his translation of 
Vocabularie Juridique—“En. 2. Corporation, partnership, company”70—
indicates as much. Second, rendering “société” as “partnership” could 
interfere with the research that some of the researchers with whom Professor 
Levasseur is concerned—the multilinguists—might have wished to conduct 
in other foreign civil law languages. That is because, in those other 
languages, legal scholarship pertaining to the concept that lies behind the 
French term “société” is written and indexed in terms of cognates of that 
term—for example, “sociedad” in Spanish—that bear no resemblance to 
“partnership.” Because that is the case, one could argue—along much the 
same lines as those given by Professor Levasseur for rejecting “duress” as a 
proper rendering of “violence”—that one should abandon the equivalent 
“partnership” in rendering “société” in favor of something else, perhaps the 
ready-made English language cognate “society.” 
Like the first criticism, this one can also be answered. Professor 
Levasseur is hardly the only translator to have chosen to render “bail” as 
“lease” and “société” as “partnership.” To the contrary, every other 
translator who has faced that decision has made the same choice, including 
the translators of the first Louisiana Civil Code (the Digest of 1808) and 
of the Quebec Civil Code. As a result, the English language literature on 
the subjects of “bail” and “société” that has been produced in those two 
jurisdictions is all indexed under “lease” and “partnership,” respectively. 
Thus, to the extent that Professor Levasseur wishes to produce a 
translation that will direct researchers—in particular, the monolinguists—
                                                                                                             
Italian, “affitto”; in Portuguese, “arrendamento.” Thus, even if Professor 
Levasseur had used, say, some English cognate of “bail” to render that term, it 
would have been of no help to this group of researchers. 
 70. DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL CODE, supra note 4, at 527. 
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to pertinent English-language research materials, “lease” and 
“partnership” are good choices. 
Still other considerations weigh in favor of Professor Levasseur’s 
renderings of “bail” and “société.” With respect to “bail,” whether there 
is an alternative rendering that might even be feasible is unclear. To be 
sure, cognates for “bail” exist in the English language namely, “bail” and 
“bailment.” Those cognates, however, have radically different meanings 
from “bail.” In the language of the common law, “bail” refers to “[a] 
security such as cash, a bond, or property; esp., security required by a court 
for the release of a criminal defendant who must appear in court at a future 
time”71—a criminal law concept. “Bailment” refers to “[a] delivery of 
personal property by one person (the bailor) to another (the bailee) who 
holds the property for a certain purpose, usu. under an express or implied-
in-fact contract”72—what a civil lawyer would call “deposit”—which, 
though a kind of contract at least, nevertheless is one that has only a 
superficial relationship to “lease.” With respect to “société,” Professor 
Levasseur has been careful to render it as “partnership” only where the 
term has been used in that context, as opposed to that of “corporation.” 
Where, in context, the term has been used instead in the sense of 
“corporation,” he has chosen that rendering instead. 
In these two examples, we see displayed some of the inherent 
difficulties involved in practicing the “art” of legal translation. In relation 
to both “bail” and “société,” one can point to one or more of his “maxims” 
of legal translation to build a case for using something other than the 
common law equivalent, such as a cognate. At the same time, however, 
following those maxims to that conclusion could ultimately frustrate one 
or more of the particular objectives he hopes to achieve through legal 
translation. In such a case, the artist must make a judgment. In the two 
instances in question, the artist—Professor Levasseur—has chosen to go 
with his particular objectives. And I believe he has made the right call. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay has endeavored to provide an exposé of the approach that 
Professor Levasseur has taken to legal translation, an effort in which I dare 
to hope I have in some measure succeeded. This exposé has led the reader 
through the various elements of that approach: the understanding of the 
deep and intimate relationship between law and language that underpins 
his method of translation; his understanding of what legal translation is; 
the method itself, including his understanding of the proper objectives of 
                                                                                                             
 71. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 167 (10th ed. 2014). 
 72. Id. at 169. 
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legal translation, especially in the context of translations of French civil 
law texts into English; and his view of the proper means for pursuing those 
ends, which I have re-presented in the form of various “how to” maxims. 
Along the way of this exposé, I have shown that every single one of these 
elements of his approach is sound—that it rests on a foundation of clear 
thinking and prudent judgment—and that the application of his method in 
the course of many real-world translation exercises has produced laudable 
tangible results. For these reasons, Professor Levasseur very much 
deserves the title “legal linguist” in the most exalted sense of that term. 
